我国银行危机救助法律制度的缺陷及其改进

银行危机救助法律制度是有效化解银行危机的一个重要保障机制,是金融安全法制的有机组成部分.本文分析了我国银行危机救助法律制度存在的问题,在借鉴国外相关立法与经验的基础上,提出了改进我国银行危机救助法律制度的措施,即改革中央银行最后贷款人制度、完善对危机银行的接管制度和尽快建立明确的存款保险制度.     

最后贷款人(LLR)制度:香港经验及其启示

本文在对香港金融管理局履行最后贷款人角色和国内近几年地方政府动用公共资源对地方法人类金融机构进行资本救助、财务重组情况进行总结的基础上,研究认为:处置地方法人类金融机构的风险,必须发挥地方政府的积极作用;建立我国基于市场机制作用的真正的LLR制度;更严格地限制异地非金融机构类股东入股地方法人类金融机构;适当扩大外汇储备的运用范围.     

Bank liquidity regulation and the lender of last resort

Banks can make suboptimal liquidity choices and gamble for lender of last resort (LOLR) support. Endogenous bailout rents are driven by the need to preserve bankers' incentives under uncertain net worth. In equilibrium, banks can herd in risk management, choosing suboptimal liquidity when they expect others to do so. Optimal liquidity can be restored by quantitative requirements, but such regulation is costly. An LOLR policy incorporating bank capital information can reduce distorting rents and allow for a more efficient solution, but may only be possible in transparent economies.     

关于城市交通最后一公里的想法

论文结合城市交通中到发始末的端头一公里中存在的一些问题,分析其对城市居民生活造成的影响,并针对这些问题提出了一些看法与畅想。     

苏南城市物流“最后一里”运营思路初探

苏南诸城市由于城市化进程快、经济发展水平高,"最后一里"问题在城市物流中逐渐形成制约其城市发展的"瓶颈",成为城市物流中影响其运作效率、甚至间接影响环境的城市物流问题。针对该问题,应以地方政府主导、第四方物流整合供应商主持、规范物流合同来保障,以及设定城市配送中心等方法,多管齐下,综合加以解决。     

What's in a frame? Social organization,risk perception and the sociology of knowledge

A central problem in the sociology of knowledge has been to show that sane people can intelligibly have quite different alternative understandings of the same problem, such as a kind of risk, without abandoning the idea that there is a real problem about which to disagree, and to show the social basis of both plurality and viability. In recent decades, attempts to make this problem tractable have focused on the idea of a ‘frame’. Theories of frames offer accounts of the range of content, as distinguished from theories of processes of diffusion, of which risk amplification theory is the best known example. In this article, several theories of frames – those of Goffman, D'Andrade, Moscovici, Gamson, Schön and Rein, and of prospect theory – found are to be inadequate, because of their lack of clarity and plausibility in their answers to four key questions: ‘what is the relationship between sense‐making and bias?’, ‘how are frames to be individuated?’, ‘where do frames come from?’, and ‘how far and how can people move between frames?’. The article makes the case for a neo‐Durkheimian institutional theory developed by Douglas and others. This approach derives frames as concrete applications to specific contexts from thought styles, which are in turn the product of solidarities or institutional styles of social organization, because it can offer clear, testable, parsimonious hypotheses with which to answer these four questions. The theory therefore provides an account of the institutional logic of framing, and presents reasons for preferring this to non‐institutional approaches such as the various kinds of cognitivism. The article offers three conceptual innovations with which to develop the neo‐Durkheimian theory, in order better to deal with the crucial fourth question about the scope for mobility between frames. These innovations and some specific hypotheses about the scope for mobility between frames are supported by consideration of some exploratory qualitative empirical research on privacy risk perception. The theory provides a more satisfactory strategy for tackling the core problem than most others, by showing plurality to be limited, by showing clear and specific social bases for plurality of frames, by neither wholly endorsing nor wholly rejecting any basic bias, and by showing that their conflictual and systemic interdependence is what makes for viability.     

近期银行间市场隔夜拆借利率波动的原因分析

2011年以来,银行间市场隔夜拆借利率波动明显增强。尤其在月末与次月初表现得更为明显。这反映了银行流动性趋紧、货币调控“边际效应”增强的影响,也与存款“冲时点”有一定关联,从而使央行流动性调节与管理面临新的挑战。为此,有必要进一步加强对银行体系流动性走势的预测分析,研究改进商业银行流动性考核方式,使银行体系流动性保持在合理水平。     

Systemic banks and the lender of last resort

We propose a model where systemic and non-systemic banks are exposed to liquidity shortfalls so that a lender of last resort policy is required. We find that it is socially optimal to override the decision of the central bank by the unconditional provision of liquidity support when the shortfall is large enough, i.e. in crisis times. The existence of systemic banks provides a rationale for the central bank to act as lender of last resort for non-systemic banks in a larger range of their liquidity shortfalls. However, the impact of systemic risk on the optimal allocation of the lender of last resort responsibilities for systemic banks depends on the relative size of counteracting effects.     

Central bank rules in historical perspective

This article explains that, while Walter Bagehot׳s Lombard Street had a rule about the central bank׳s role as a lender of last resort, it was not a precursor of the rules-based approach to monetary policy. Monetary policy rules came into fashion in the 1980s and 1990s when it became clear from the 1970s just how dangerous discretion could be. Under different historical circumstances before that and in more recent times, it was rules that seemed much inferior to discretion.     

Lessons from a century of FED policy: Why monetary and credit policies need rules and boundaries

Wide operational and financial independence given to monetary and credit policies subjects the Federal Reserve to incentives detrimental for macroeconomic and financial stability. The absence of a monetary policy rule created go-stop incentives that produced inefficient volatility of both inflation and unemployment during the Great Inflation. Fed credit policy has undergone massive “mission creep” since the Fed was established. Being debt-financed fiscal policy, Fed credit policy beyond ordinary temporary lending to solvent depositories creates friction with the fiscal authorities and jeopardizes the Fed׳s independence. An ambiguous boundary of expansive Fed credit policy creates expectations of Fed accommodation in financial crisis—that blunts the incentive of private entities to take protective measures beforehand (to shrink counter-party risk and reliance on short-term finance, and build up equity capital) and blunts the incentive of the fiscal authorities to prepare procedures in advance to act systematically in times of credit turmoil. These points are illustrated with reference to the 2007–09 financial crisis. Part of the problem is that the independent Fed does not have the same incentive as the 19th century Bank of England to follow Bagehot׳s Rule. The paper concludes with a set of principles to preserve a workable, sustainable division of responsibilities between the independent central bank and the fiscal authorities.